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LABOR’S WAGE WAR
Catherine K. Ruckelshaus*
INTRODUCTION
Almost every growing sector in the bottom half of our econ-
omy—health care, child care, retail, building services, construction,
and hospitality—is plagued by penurious employers who drag
down working conditions for everyone.  Common schemes emerge
in jobs with sweatshop conditions: employers hide behind subcon-
tractors, call their workers “independent contractors” not covered
by workplace laws, and hire immigrant workers who are subjected
to substandard conditions.  Firms must adopt similar practices to
stay competitive.  Workers in many of these jobs make the mini-
mum wage or less.  Minimum wage for a full-time worker today
translates into an annual income of only $12,168.  Consequently,
many important jobs cannot bring people out of poverty and work-
ers across the socio-economic spectrum are impacted.
Far from ramping up enforcement to combat these unlawful
practices, federal and state public agencies have reduced staffing
and enforcement efforts.  Private enforcement is hampered by
rules against class actions under the federal minimum wage law.
The labor movement has stepped into this void, partnering with
community organizations and law-abiding employers, creating rela-
tionships with state departments of labor and attorneys general,
and supporting private labor standards enforcement models to
shore up the wage floor for all workers.
Part I of this Article describes the trends that result in bad jobs,
including the U.S. Department of Labor’s inaction, employer
dodges including subcontracting and independent contractor mis-
classification, and the barriers workers face to protesting their un-
paid and underpaid wages.  Part II showcases some of the more
exciting of these new labor standards enforcement models, includ-
ing: (1) labor and management-funded “Taft-Hartley Funds” such
as the Maintenance Cooperation Trust Fund in California and the
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national network of Foundations for Fair Contracting, which use
union and employer monies to police wage and hour violators; (2)
the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Or-
ganizations’ (“AFL-CIO”)’ national worker center partnership,
creating new collaborations with community organizing groups in
the day labor and faith-based communities; (3) the Service Em-
ployees International Union’s wage and hour project, supporting
private and public agency enforcement of fair pay rights for jani-
tors, security guards, and home health-care workers across the
country; and (4) the New York Civic Participation Project, a union-
community collaboration that promotes worker justice and civic
empowerment for new immigrants.1  Part III briefly assesses these
new models and suggests possible directions for continued success.
I. TODAY’S TRENDS THAT MAINTAIN BAD JOBS
As we lose manufacturing jobs to overseas markets, the jobs left
behind—health care, child care, retail, building services, construc-
tion, and hospitality—are not good jobs.  In addition to providing
paltry benefits, if any, employers in these sectors routinely violate
bedrock employment rights like the right to be paid fully for work
and the right to a safe workplace.2  Employers in these industries
maneuver to cut costs at any price: they hide behind subcontrac-
tors, call their workers “independent contractors” not covered by
workplace laws, and hire immigrant workers who are vulnerable to
1. This Article is not focused on community-based efforts that are not affiliated
with organized labor, of which there are many vibrant examples, but rather on those
partnerships where labor and community seek to collaborate on wage and hour cam-
paigns or strategies.  Nor does this Article describe important approaches by labor to
ensure fair pay for workers by enhancing collective bargaining rights for all workers.
See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Something Old, Something New:  Governing the Workplace
by Contract Again, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 351, 357-58 (2007) (describing labor’s
support of neutrality agreements to gain collective bargaining rights). Finally, this
Article does not describe the important private minimum wage litigation by the mi-
grant farmworker bar, which, aside from the U.S. Department of Labor, has almost
single-handedly established  the existing case law under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”) in this country. See, e.g., Bruce Goldstein, Marc Linder, Laurence E. Nor-
ton & Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern
American Sweatshop:  Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46
UCLA L. REV. 983, 988 (1999) (chronicling leading migrant farmworker FLSA
cases).  These are separate but complementary ventures.
2. See, e.g., Nat’l Employment Law Project, Holding the Wage Floor:  Enforce-
ment of Wage and Hour Standards for Low-Wage Workers in an Era of Gov’t Inaction
and Employer Unaccountability, Immigration & Nonstandard Worker Project Policy
Update, Oct. 2006, http://www.nelp.org/docUploads/Holding%20the%20Wage%20
Floor2%2Epdf [hereinafter Holding the Wage Floor] (containing studies and data dis-
cussing these employer violations).
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exploitation.3  As if that were not enough, workers face barriers to
enforcing their basic job rights, including antiquated rules for
bringing class actions in private litigation, and fear of reprisals that
go unchecked when workers complain.
A. The United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) Is Not
Enforcing Its Laws, and Interprets Its Role Narrowly
Public enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)
and other baseline workplace standards is down, with some notable
exceptions; federal and state agencies charged with enforcing base-
line wage and hour laws are not having an impact.  Employers
know that there is little to fear from public enforcement of work-
place violations, and so do not change their practices.4  In addition,
the DOL has interpreted laws to exempt large classes of low-wage
workers from basic wage and hour protections, including profes-
sional home health-care companions.5  In general, despite the per-
sistence of sub-par jobs, the DOL has not made it a priority to stem
these abuses.
3. For illustrations of subcontracting in lower-wage and service jobs, see NAT’L
EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT & FARMWORKER JUSTICE FUND, INC., FROM ORCHARDS
TO THE INTERNET:  CONFRONTING CONTINGENT WORK ABUSE (2002), http://www.
nelp.org/docUploads/pub120.pdf [hereinafter FROM ORCHARDS TO THE INTERNET].
Independent contractor abuses have been much-studied of late. See, e.g., Providing
Fairness to Workers Who Have Been Misclassified as Independent Contractors:  Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Workforce Protections of the H. Comm. on Educ. &
Labor, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://edworkforce.house.gov/hearings/wp032
707.shtml; The Misclassification of Workers as Independent Contractors:  What Policies
and Practices Best Protect Workers?:   Hearing Before the Subcomms. on Health, Em-
ployment, Labor, and Pensions & Workforce Protections of the H. Comm. on Educ.
And Labor, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://edworkforce.house.gov/hearings/
help072407.shtml; The Effects of Misclassifying Workers as Independent Contractors:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Income Sec. and Family Support of the H. Comm. on
Ways & Means, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hear-
ings.asp?formmode=detail&hearing=556.  For analysis on employers’ incentive to hire
undocumented workers and then mistreat them, see, for example, Christopher Ho &
Jennifer C. Chang, Drawing the Line After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
NLRB:  Strategies for Protecting Undocumented Workers in the Title VII Context and
Beyond, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 473, 492 (2005).
4. David Weil, Compliance with the Minimum Wage:  Can Government Make a
Difference?, 2-5 (Sloan Workshop Series in Industry Studies, 2004), http://www.soc.
duke.edu/sloan_2004/Papers/Weil_MinimumWagepaper_May04.pdf [hereinafter Weil,
Compliance].
5. The recent U.S. Supreme Court case of Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v.
Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339, 2351-52 (2007), upheld the DOL’s regulation stating that home
health-care workers employed by agencies to work in patients’ homes are exempt
from minimum wage and overtime under federal law.
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The Wage and Hour Division (“WHD”) at the DOL enforces
many laws, including the FLSA, which sets the minimum wage and
overtime rules, prohibits retaliation against complaining workers,
and restricts child labor.6  The FLSA authorizes DOL lawsuits on
behalf of employees, as well as lawsuits by individual employees.7
While public agencies are by their nature underfunded and un-
derstaffed, the DOL has been particularly undersubsidized in re-
cent years.  In addition, it has failed to use its resources
strategically to have the broadest impact, as it has in the past with,
for instance, targeted audits and affirmative task forces aimed at
priority industries.8
From 1975 to 2004, the budget for DOL WHD investigators de-
creased by 14% (to a total of only 788 individuals nationwide), and
enforcement actions decreased by 36%, while the number of busi-
nesses covered by the wage and hour law increased from 7.8 mil-
lion to 8.3 million.9  The DOL’s overall budget to enforce wage and
hour laws is now 6.1% less than before President George W. Bush
took office.10
DOL legal resources have also suffered, impacting its ability to
enforce the laws.  In fiscal year 1992, the Solicitor’s Office, respon-
sible for enforcing all laws under the DOL’s jurisdiction, had 786
employees,11 an increase of 59% since fiscal year 1966.  But, since
fiscal year 1992, despite the fact that two additional laws have been
added to the responsibilities of the Solicitor’s Office, the Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1993 and substantial amendments to the
Mine Safety and Health Act in 2006, the number of employees of
6. 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq. (West 2007).  The WHD also enforces the Davis-
Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 3141 (2006), requiring payment of prevailing wages on federal
government contracts for the construction, alteration, or repair of public buildings or
works, and the Service Contract Act, 41 U.S.C. § 351 (2006), another prevailing wage
law covering service contracts, such as those for removal of debris and trash; custo-
dial, janitorial, or guard service; cafeteria and food service; and packing and crating.
7. 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West 2007).
8. See Adequacy of Labor Law Enforcement in New Orleans:  Hearing Before H.
Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Hearing on
Oversight and Gov’t Reform] (testimony of Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, National Em-
ployment Law Project), available at http://domesticpolicy.oversight.house.gov/docu-
ments/20070703121612.pdf.
9. ANNETE BERNHARDT & SIOBHA´N MCGRATH, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUS-
TICE, TRENDS IN WAGE AND HOUR ENFORCEMENT BY THE U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
1975-2004 1-2 (Sept. 2005), http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/down
load_file_8423.pdf.
10. Judd Legum et al., Labor—Bush Priorities Hurt Workers, Help Employers
(Under the Radar), THE PROGRESS REPORT, June 14, 2006.
11. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Budget Submission to Congress for Fiscal Year 1993 (on
file with author).
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the Solicitor’s Office has declined markedly; in January 2007, it was
down to 590 employees nationwide.12
The DOL has focused its attention on employer compliance and
education in the last eight years, and has deemphasized audits and
affirmative investigations.13  Some of the few enforcement actions
it did bring have been challenged as insufficient.  For example, a
celebrated settlement with Wal-Mart over child labor violations in
Connecticut aroused the wrath of Congress members, who de-
manded that the DOL explain its decision to permit Wal-Mart to
have fifteen days to fix any worker complaints before the DOL
would investigate.14
Because it has not emphasized its ability to conduct audits or
investigations generated internally, the DOL conducts its current
wage and hour law enforcement based almost wholly on worker
complaints.15  This is a problem for low-wage and immigrant work-
ers in particular, who face serious barriers to complaining to the
DOL.16
In 2001, the WHD conducted as many as 55% of its investiga-
tions by fax or phone, and it is five times more likely to find viola-
tions of recordkeeping requirements when it visits a workplace.17
When the risk of enforcement is small, systemic violations of wage
and hour laws become the norm in these sectors.18  When the DOL
does enforce its workplace laws, it makes a difference in the wage
12. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FY 2008 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION DE-
PARTMENTAL MANAGEMENT DM-27 (2007), http://www.dol.gov/dol/budget/2008/
PDF/CBJ-2008-V3-02.pdf.  Although the Solicitor’s office had 590 employees in Janu-
ary 2007, it had funding to pay for only 551 employees. Id. at DM-28.
13. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Labor, DOL Officials Travel to Provide Com-
pliance Assistance on New Overtime Rules (June 14, 2004), http://www.dol.gov/opa/
media/press/esa/ESA20041081.htm.
14. See Press Release, Representative George Miller, U.S. House of Representa-
tives, Inspector Gen. Agrees to Review Deal Between Wal-Mart & Department of
Labor, Says Miller (Feb. 18, 2005) (on file with author); see also Diane Stafford, Wage
and Hour Cases:  Worker Advocacy Groups Object to Practice, THE KANSAS CITY
STAR, Oct. 1, 2006 (describing DOL settlements of half of unpaid wages owed).
15. See Hearing on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, supra note 8, at 10. R
16. For example, in 2004, seventy-four percent of all WHD enforcement was from
worker complaints.  David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Complaints, Com-
pliance, and the Problem of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 59, 60 (2006).
17. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), LABOR’S EFFORTS TO ENFORCE
PROTECTIONS FOR DAY LABORERS COULD BENEFIT FROM BETTER DATA AND GUI-
DANCE 18-19 (2002), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02925.pdf.
18. David Weil, Public Enforcement/Private Monitoring:  Evaluating a New Ap-
proach to Regulating the Minimum Wage, 58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 238, 238-57
(2005).
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levels of workers in workplaces beyond those it chooses to bring
enforcements actions against.19
In addition, in the context of fewer enforcement resources over-
all, the DOL has taken the unusual step of intervening in ongoing
litigation on the side of employers.  In one instance, the DOL sup-
ported the employer’s argument in an opinion letter sought by a
trade association during the pendency of litigation,20 and in an-
other, wrote an internal memorandum purporting to clarify the in-
tent of its previously-enacted regulations regarding coverage of
home health-care workers under minimum wage and overtime law,
supporting the employer’s argument while the case was pending
before the U.S. Supreme Court.21
In another example of narrowly interpreting its own enforce-
ment power, the current WHD administrator has stated on several
occasions that it is not a violation of any of the laws enforced by
the WHD to misclassify workers as independent contractors.22
This is false, as the DOL can and should investigate any complaints
by workers claiming unpaid wages, whether or not they are called
independent contractors.  If the DOL does not investigate workers
who are called independent contractors, it will miss violations of
the FLSA.  In addition, it is a violation of the FLSA to fail to keep
records of hours and pay for all workers.  The WHD’s view of its
enforcement role is also unduly constricted, and sends a message to
employers and employees that the WHD is not going to go out of
its way to affirmatively seek out violations.
B. Employers Are Maneuvering in This Climate
of Non-accountability
With increasing frequency, employers misclassify employees as
“independent contractors,” either by giving their employees an
IRS Form 1099 instead of a Form W-2, or by paying them off-the-
19. See Weil, Compliance, supra note 4; Howard Wial, Minimum Wage Enforce- R
ment and the Low-Wage Labor Market 19-20 (MIT Task Force on Reconstructing
America’s Labor Market Institutions, Working Paper No. WP11, 1999).
20. Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, Inc., Wage and Hour Official Faces Criticisms Over
Opinion Letters Linked to Litigation, 21 LAB. REL. WEEK 316, 316 (2007).
21. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR ADVISORY MEMORANDUM, NO 2005-
1, APPLICATION OF SECTION 13(A)(15) TO THIRD PARTY EMPLOYERS (Dec. 1, 2005),
https://dol.gov/esa/whd/FieldBulletins/AdvisoryMemoranda2005.pdf.
22. See, e.g., Statement of Paul DeCamp, Administrator of the Wage & Hour Divi-
sion, U.S. Dep’t of Labor before the Subcomms. on Workforce Protections & Health,
Employment, Labor & Pensions of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 110th Cong.
(2007), available at http://edworkforce.house.gov/testimony/072407PaulDeCampTesti-
mony.pdf.
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books and not reporting or paying taxes.23  Businesses also insert
subcontractors who are often undercapitalized, including tempo-
rary help firms and labor brokers, between them and their workers.
This creates another layer of potentially-responsible entities and
creates confusion among workers as to who is actually their em-
ployer.24  While there are true independent business people not
covered by labor and employment protections as “employees,” and
while there is nothing inherently wrong with firms subcontracting-
out labor, these mechanisms create barriers to enforcing the base-
line work rules such as minimum wage and overtime and cost the
government billions of dollars in lost tax and insurance revenues.25
1. Subcontracting
Outsourcing employees to labor intermediaries such as tempo-
rary or leasing firms or labor brokers allows companies to argue
that the intermediate entity is the sole employer responsible for
pay rules, and allows them to dodge responsibility.26  Often, the
subcontractor lacks the resources to pay legally-mandated wages.27
Wal-Mart and leading restaurant chains such as Outback
Steakhouses have recently come under fire for hiring cleaning ser-
vices through fly-by-night labor brokers who underpay janitors.28
23. See generally Nat’l Employment Law Project, 1099’d:  Misclassification of Em-
ployees as Independent Contractors (2005), http://www.nelp.org/docUploads/inde-
pendent%20contractor%20misclassification%2Epdf [hereinafter 1099’d].
24. See FROM ORCHARDS TO THE INTERNET, supra note 3; see also Employment R
Arrangements: Improved Outreach Could Help Ensure Proper Worker Classification,
GAO-06-656 (July 2006).
25. See FISCAL POLICY INSTITUTE, NEW YORK STATE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION:
HOW BIG IS THE COVERAGE SHORTFALL? (Jan. 2007), http://www.fiscalpolicy.org/
publications2007/FPI_WorkersCompShortfall_WithAddendum.pdf [hereinafter COV-
ERAGE SHORTFALL] (estimating that misclassification of workers amounts to a loss of
$500 million to $1 billion annually in evaded workers’ compensation premium);
MICHAEL KELSAY ET AL., THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION
IN THE STATE OF ILLINOIS (Dec. 2006), http://www.lecetchicagoarea.org/pdfs/Illinois_
Misclassification_Study.pdf (estimating that misclassification of workers in 2005 re-
sulted in a $53.7 million loss of unemployment insurance taxes and a $149 million to
$250 million loss of income tax, and that $97.9 million in workers’ compensation pre-
miums were not paid properly in 2004).
26. See, e.g., Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern
American Sweatshop:  Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46
UCLA L. REV. 983, 988 (1999).
27. Id.; see also Reyes v. Remington Hybrid Seed Co., 495 F.3d 403, 405 (7th Cir.
2007).
28. See Steven Greenhouse, Among Janitors, Labor Violations Go with the Job,
N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2005, at A2; Restaurant Cleaning Company Agrees to $63,800
Settlement, THE BUS. REV. (ALBANY), Mar. 17, 2005, available at http://albany.biz
journals.com/albany/stories/2005/03/14/daily41.html.
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Microsoft shifted handling of computer software programmers’ pay
checks to a leasing company and then argued the programmers
were not entitled to Microsoft’s benefits because they were not
“employees” of Microsoft.29
Many companies seek to shift all employment-related responsi-
bility to labor contractors.30  When workers are fired unjustly or
fail to receive the pay they are owed, companies often claim that
they do not employ the workers and that the labor contractor is
solely responsible.
In many settings, labor contractors need not acquire significant
capital or skills to operate a business.  Contractors compete for
business with low bids that depend on driving labor costs lower and
worker productivity higher.  Many contractors do not earn enough
money to pay business expenses and comply with minimum wage,
overtime, workers’ compensation premiums, unemployment com-
pensation, Social Security deductions, and other basic standards,
much less make a profit.31  In many cases, the labor contractor ac-
cepts this scheme as the price of becoming the middleman.
A July 2007 decision from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held a seed corn company responsible for the unpaid wages of
workers hired and recruited by a labor broker.  The court
explained:
If everyone abides by the law, treating a firm . . . as a joint em-
ployer will not increase its costs. . . .  Only when it hires a fly-by-
night operator . . . is [the firm] exposed to the risk of liability on
top of the amount it has agreed to pay the contractor.  And
there are ways to avoid this risk: either deal only with other sub-
stantial businesses or hold back enough on the contract to en-
sure that workers have been paid in full.32
2. Misclassifying Workers as Independent Contractors
In independent contractor schemes, firms argue they are off-the-
hook for any violations of rules protecting “employees.”  This de-
prives workers of essential rights, including: minimum wage and
overtime premium pay, a healthy and safe workplace, family and
medical leave, equal opportunity, and the right to join a union and
engage in collective bargaining.33  Workers also lose out on safety-
29. Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1996).
30. See FROM ORCHARDS TO THE INTERNET, supra note 3. R
31. Remington, 495 F.3d at 405.
32. Id. at 409.
33. See Providing Fairness to Workers Who Have Been Misclassified as Indep.
Contractors:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Workforce Protection of the H. Comm.
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net benefits including unemployment insurance, workers’ compen-
sation, Social Security, and Medicare.34  For example, FedEx calls
its drivers “independent contractors,” while UPS treats its drivers
as employees.35  By misclassifying its employees, employers stand
to save upwards of 30% of their payroll costs, including employer-
side FICA and FUTA tax obligations, workers’ compensation and
state unemployment, and disability taxes paid for “employees.”36
Businesses that “1099” and pay off-the-books can undercut com-
petitors in labor-intensive sectors like construction and building
services, which creates an unfair marketplace.
Labeling employees “independent contractors” is a broad prob-
lem and affects a wide range of jobs.  A DOL study found that up
to 30% of firms misclassify their employees as independent con-
tractors.37  At least eleven states have studied the problem and
found high rates of misclassification.  As many as four in ten con-
struction workers were found to be misclassified.38  An Illinois
study completed in December 2006 found that nearly 20% of au-
dited employers misclassified their employees as independent con-
tractors.  This was a 21% increase from 2001 to 2005.39
Independent contractor misclassification occurs with an alarming
frequency in construction,40 day labor,41 janitorial and building ser-
vices,42 home health care,43 child care,44  agriculture,45 poultry and
on Educ. & Labor, 110th Cong.  (2007) (testimony of Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Na-
tional Employment Law Project), available at http://www.nelp.org/docUploads/Inde-
pendentContractorTestimony2007%2Epdf.
34. See id.
35. Steven Greenhouse, Teamsters Hope to Lure FedEx Drivers, N.Y. TIMES, May
30, 2006, at A12 (cataloguing cases).
36. See 1099’d, supra note 23.
37. LALITH DE SILVA ET AL., PLANMATICS, INC., INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS:
PREVALENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAMS
(2000), http://wdr.doleta.gov/owsdrr/00-5/00-5.pdf (prepared for U.S. Dep’t of Labor
Employment and Training Division).
38. See COVERAGE SHORTFALL, supra note 25; KELSAY ET AL., supra note 25;
Peter Fisher et al., Nonstandard Jobs, Substandard Benefits (Iowa Policy Project 2005);
FRANCOIS CARRE & J.W. MCCORMACK, CONST. POLICY RESEARCH CTR., THE SO-
CIAL AND ECONOMIC COST OF EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION IN CONSTRUCTION 1
(2004); STATE OF N.J., COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION, CONTRACT LABOR:  THE
MAKING OF AN UNDERGROUND ECONOMY 2 (1997).
39. KELSAY ET AL., supra note 25, at 4.
40. See CARRE & WILSON, supra note 38, at 2. R
41. See Abel Valenzuela et al., On the Corner:  Day Labor in the United States
(2006), http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/issr/csup/uploaded_files/Natl_DayLabor-On_the_
Corner1.pdf.
42. See Coverall N. Am., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Div. of Unemployment Assistance,
447 Mass. 852, 859 (2006); Vega v. Contract Cleaning Maint., 10 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d
(BNA) 274 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
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meat processing,46 high-tech,47 delivery,48 trucking,49 home-based
work,50 and the public sectors.51
Misclassification results in an enormous loss of revenue for fed-
eral and state governments in the form of unpaid and uncollectible
income taxes, payroll taxes, unemployment insurance, and work-
ers’ compensation premiums.  In 1996, a federal commission esti-
mated that the annual loss in federal tax revenues from
misclassification would be $3.3 billion.  That was more than ten
years ago.  Coopers & Lybrand (now PriceWaterhouse Coopers)
estimated in 1994 that proper classification of employees could in-
crease tax receipts by $34.7 billion over the period from 1996 to
2004.52
Several states have recently collected data on the costs of mis-
classifying employees as independent contractors.  The numbers of
lost payroll and other taxes are staggering.  A tally of the losses
reported in just four of the state studies amounts to approximately
$1.6 billion in lost revenue annually.53
43. See Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir.
1983).
44. See, e.g., Ill. Exec. Order No. 1, Exexutive Order on Collective Negotiation by
Day Care Home Providers (2005), available at http://www.gov.il.gov./gov/execorder.
cfm?eorder=34 (conferring bargaining status on child day-care workers otherwise
called independent contractors).
45. See Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529 (7th Cir. 1988).
46. See Employment Arrangements:  Improved Outreach Could Help Ensure
Proper Worker Classification, 30 (GAO-06-656 2006) [hereinafter Employment Ar-
rangements] (on file with the author).
47. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft, 97 F.3d 1187, 1196 (9th Cir. 1996).
48. See Ansoumana v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 255 F. Supp. 2d 184, 192
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
49. See Greenhouse, supra note 35. R
50. See Employment Arrangements, supra note 46, at 31. R
51. See New Study Documents Systematic Effort by Offshore Contractors To Target
State Government Work, GOOD JOBS FIRST, July 14, 2004, http://www.goodjobsfirst.
org/publications/Offshoring_release.cfm (citing a report by the Corporate Research
Project of Good Jobs First entitled Your Tax Dollars at Work . . . Offshore which
“spotlights the growing degree to which state governments are contracting with for-
eign outsourcing firms for public contracts and are funneling millions of state tax-
payer dollars offshore”).
52. See OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y SPECIAL REPORT, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CONTIN-
GENT WORKERS, http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/dunlop/section5.htm (citing a
1994 study by the accounting firm Coopers & Lybrand that estimated a $3.3 billion
loss) (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
53. This rough tally of the loss estimates listed below uses the high-end for those
estimates that reported a range of loss estimates. See COVERAGE SHORTFALL, supra
note 25, at 2 (estimating that misclassification of workers amounts to a loss of $500
million to $1 billion annually in evaded workers’ compensation premium); KELSAY
ET AL., supra note 25, at 6 (estimating that misclassification of workers in 2005 re-
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Adding to the magnitude of the problem, most government-com-
missioned studies do not capture the so-called “underground econ-
omy,” where workers are paid off-the-books, sometimes in cash.54
These workers are de facto misclassified independent contractors,
because the employers do not withhold and report taxes or comply
with other basic workplace rules.  Immigrant and lower-wage
workers fill many of these jobs.55
C. Workers Face Significant Barriers to Private Enforcement
of Wage and Hour Standards
Employees with wage and hour complaints face significant barri-
ers to seeking redress for those violations.  Because employment in
the United States is at-will, most workers fear employer reprisals
for complaining about wage and hour violations, including losing
their jobs.56  In addition, as illustrated above, public agency en-
forcement at the DOL has largely abandoned audit- and investiga-
tion-based enforcement, to become primarily reliant on worker
complaints.57  In the face of government non-involvement, private
lawsuits have become more popular, but employees bringing pri-
vate lawsuits cannot bring class actions because of a unique federal
law limitation in the federal FLSA requiring each individual
worker to affirmatively opt-in to a lawsuit by filing a written con-
sent to sue with the court.58  This mechanism, not found in almost
all other labor and employment laws, hampers the workers’ ability
to stand up for their rights as a group.59  Immigrant workers face an
additional barrier to enforcing their rights if the employer threat-
ens to or does in fact call in the Bureau of Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement (“ICE”), which has the power to detain and, in
some cases, deport workers without work authorization.
sulted in a $53.7 million loss of unemployment insurance taxes and a $149 million to
$250 million loss of income tax, and that $97.9 million in workers’ compensation pre-
miums were not paid properly in 2004).
54. ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., UNREGULATED WORK IN THE GLOBAL CITY
(2007),  http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_49436.pdf.
55. See CARRE & MCCORMACK, supra note 38, at 8. R
56. See Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Rela-
tionship, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 671 (1996).
57. See infra Part I.A.
58. 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West 2007).
59. Only the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Equal Pay Act
adopt the FLSA’s opt-in mechanism for collective actions.
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1. Decline of Unions
Unions are an important protective buffer for workers seeking to
improve their jobs, and a lack of union presence in the workplace
causes workplace standards to decline.60  Ninety percent of work-
ers in this country are not represented by a union, even though
most workers (57%) would vote for a union if an election were
held at their worksite.61  Without the security a union offers, indi-
vidual workers are much less likely to come forward to complain
about or enforce their rights.
Additionally, without a union, employment is “at-will.”  This
means an employer may terminate its employee when it wishes,
“for good cause, for no cause, or even for a reason that is morally
wrong, without being legally wrong.”62  Thus, the vast majority of
workers may risk losing their jobs if they complain.
2. Fear of Reprisals
Workers fear retaliation (including termination) by their em-
ployers if they complain, which may cause them to quietly accept
substandard conditions.63  The United States General Accounting
Office (“GAO”) observed in a report on day labor in the United
States that government agencies are unable to do their job with
respect to day laborers because they do not find out about
violations.64
60. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of
Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319 passim (2005) (describing the important role
unions play in monitoring worksite conditions in today’s era of “chronic under en-
forcement” of workplace standards); David Weil, Enforcing OSHA:  The Role of La-
bor Unions, 30 INDUS. REL. 21, 22 (1991).
61. See Frank Swoboda, Labor Unions See Membership Gains, WASH. POST, Jan.
20, 2000, at E2; PETER D. HART RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE PUBLIC VIEW OF UN-
IONS (2005).
62. Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884).
63. This fear persists despite the FLSA’s prohibition against retaliation, contained
in 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (West 2007). See, e.g., Mitchell v. Robert de Mario Jewelry,
361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960); Contreras v. Corinthian Vigor Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 25 F.
Supp. 2d 1053, 1058-59 (N.D. Cal. 1998). See generally Jennifer Berman, The Needle
and the Damage Done:  How Hoffman Plastics Promotes Sweatshops and Illegal Im-
migration and What to Do about It, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 585, 588 (2004); Lora
Jo Foo, The Informal Economy:  The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant
Workforce and the Need for Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE
L.J. 2179, 2184 (1994); Christopher Ho & Jennifer Chang, Drawing the Line after
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB:  Strategies for Protecting Undocumented
Workers in the Title VII Context and Beyond, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 473, 492
(2005).
64. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WORKER PROTECTION:  LABOR’S
EFFORTS TO ENFORCE PROTECTIONS FOR DAY LABORERS COULD BENEFIT FROM
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Undocumented workers are particularly vulnerable to workplace
abuse, discrimination, and exploitation, as well as the fear of being
turned over to ICE.65  Recent ICE raids on workplaces with pend-
ing workplace violation investigations create confusion and fear
among workers, and send a message that the U.S. government will
enforce immigration laws against workers, but not labor standards
laws against employers.66
When workers fear coming forward to complain of unpaid
wages, it chills enforcement of the wage laws and financially re-
wards employers who illegally underpay their employees.  Workers
routinely must quietly accept violations of their rights.
3. Private Enforcement Problems
In recent years, in part due to the DOL’s quiescence, workers
have turned to the courts to enforce their fair pay rights in increas-
ing numbers.67  These lawsuits have brought important back wage
remedies to large numbers of workers and, in some cases, lasting
changes in firms’ pay practices.68  Even if massive DOL enforce-
ment reform is achieved, private wage and hour enforcement by
workers will continue to be an important supplement to ensure
compliance.
The primary obstacle workers face is the requirement that each
complaining worker affirmatively consents or “opts-in” to a law-
suit.69  This condition blocks many workers from pursuing their
claims privately, because workers fear reprisals, including job loss,
BETTER DATA AND GUIDANCE, GAO 02-925 14 (2002), http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d02925.pdf.
65. See, e.g., Rivera  v. NIBCO, 364 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004).
66. See Brent Hunsberger, Fresh Del Monte Subject of Worker Safety Probes, THE
OREGONIAN, Jun. 13, 2007, available at http://blog.oregonlive.com/business/2007/06/
fresh_del_monte_subject_of_wor.html (describing an ICE raid on a Del Monte plant
that had two pending OSHA investigations underway, where workers were rounded
up and detained).
67. See Wage Hour Collective Actions Jumped 70 Percent Since 2000, DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA), Mar. 26, 2004; Wage-Hour Actions Surpassed EEO in Federal Courts
Last Year, Survey Shows, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Mar. 22, 2002, at C1; Admin.
Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, Number of Wage and
Hour Lawsuits Up Again in 2006 (2001-2006) (on file with author).
68. See, e.g., Ansoumana v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 255 F. Supp. 2d 184
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (retail chains eliminated middlemen labor brokers and hired delivery
persons directly after FLSA lawsuit).
69. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West 2007).  For an analysis of the problems that
arise under Section 216(b), see Craig Becker & Paul Strauss, Representing Low-Wage
Workers in the Absence of a Class:  The Peculiar Case of Section 16 of the Fair Labor
Standards Act & the Underenforcement of Minimum Labor Standards.  92 MINN. L.
REV. (forthcoming Spring 2008).
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often putting them in a job-or-pay situation.  In addition, individual
workers’ claims for unpaid wages often do not amount to enough
to make expensive litigation economically feasible, and thus, work-
ers lose access to the courts.70  The opt-in structure also means
other worker representatives may not bring a lawsuit on behalf of a
group of co-workers, as is the case in almost every other federal
labor and employment law.71
Under the FLSA, workers must affirmatively opt-in to a collec-
tive action by filing a written “consent to sue” with the court or by
signing their name to a complaint stating their intention to proceed
collectively.72  Until a worker opts-in, the statute of limitations
runs, unlike a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 class action,
which tolls the statute of limitations once the lawsuit is filed for a
putative class.73  Because workers have only two years from the
onset of any wage and hour violation to file a claim under federal
law, time is of the essence.  When workers are reluctant to come
forward alone, and are more likely to complain with the protection
of a group of co-workers, the FLSA’s notice and consent-to-sue
requirement further limits workers’ ability to recover back wages
because each week that is lost means less unpaid wages owed by
the employer.
In contrast, nearly all other labor and employment laws, includ-
ing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,74 ERISA,75 and other
federal workplace protective laws, use the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure class action procedures under rule 23, which allow
workers to proceed as a group if all elements of the rule are met.76
The statute of limitations clock is stopped for all workers in a po-
tential class upon filing a lawsuit.77  In rule 23 class actions, workers
receive notice of a potential class action and are included in the
class unless they affirmatively opt-out of the lawsuit.78
70. See, e.g., Ansoumana v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 201 F.R.D. 81, 85-86
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (individual suits as an alternative to class actions are not practical
because some claims are not large enough to provide an incentive for individual ac-
tion.); Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 87 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 705, 745 (Cal. App. Dep’t
Super. Ct. 2001).
71. See supra note 59. R
72. 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b).
73. See McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 134 (1988); see also FED.
R. CIV. P. 23.
74. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e) (West 2007).
75. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a) (West 2007).
76. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
77. See Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 662 (1983).
78. See Crown, Cork & Seal v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 351 (1983); Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 181 (1974).
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For several reasons, including fear of reprisal and an unwilling-
ness to act, individuals typically do not respond to notices of collec-
tive action by taking affirmative steps to opt-in or opt-out of class
action lawsuits.  This means that an opt-in rule, like the FLSA’s,
tends to produce low participation rates while an opt-out rule tends
to produce high participation rates relative to potential class size.
The FLSA’s opt-in rule thus results in smaller numbers of employ-
ees participating in a lawsuit and substantially less exposure to lia-
bility for employers, who then have less to fear and less incentive
to change their pay practices when caught.  The opt-in regime un-
dermines wage and hour enforcement.79
As the Supreme Court has observed:
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to
overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the
incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting
his or her rights.  A class action solves this problem by aggregat-
ing the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something
worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.80
For an individual employee to hire a private attorney to press a
claim in court for unpaid overtime or minimum wages against an
employer, a worker would likely have to spend a good part of his
or her annual salary to retain the attorney.  If the worker could
convince the private attorney to represent him, the attorney would
require periodic fee payments.  While the FLSA permits recovery
of attorneys’ fees for successful plaintiffs, the actual amounts re-
covered in low-wage cases are often insufficient to tempt private
attorneys to undertake the case.81  As the fight in court against the
employer progressed, the individual worker would have to con-
tinue to make periodic fee payments, pay for discovery, prelimi-
nary discovery motions, and any substantive legal motions filed by
either side.  For a relatively small amount of damages, this is not
economically feasible for the vast majority of workers.
A district court in Minnesota, granting class action status in a
wage and hour lawsuit against Wal-Mart, concluded:
79. See Marc Linder, Class Struggle at the Door:  The Origins of the Portal-to-Por-
tal Act of 1947, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 53, 167 (1991) (noting that the opt-in requirement
“has injured unorganized workers, who, deprived of the opt-out class action, are re-
mitted to a very ineffectual means of pressuring employers to comply with FLSA”).
80. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v.
Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
81. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (West 2007).
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With individual claims of this size, members of the class have
little practical ability to prosecute their claims in separate ac-
tions, in light of the substantial cost associated with gathering
and presenting the evidence described above.  If the class is not
certified, individual claimants effectively would be denied any
remedy because the expense of prosecuting individual claims
likely would vastly exceed the amount in controversy for each
claim.82
Private enforcement by workers and their representatives can
serve an important deterrent effect.  Individual lawsuits can re-
cover attorneys’ fees, liquidated damages at twice the amount of
unpaid wages, and compensatory and even punitive damages in re-
taliation claims.83  The statute of limitations is two years, but may
be extended to three, if the employer’s behavior is willful.84  The
DOL does not seek these full remedies often while private litigants
often seek full recourse.
D. Many Jobs Do Not Even Pay the Basic Minimum
Wage and Overtime Pay
Because of the confluence of these trends, it should come as no
surprise that workplace standards are on the decline.  Recent gov-
ernment and private studies show many of our fastest-growing ser-
vice jobs have appalling minimum wage and overtime compliance
rates:85
• A majority of restaurants in New York City are out of
compliance;86
• Twenty-six percent of domestic workers in New York City
earn below the poverty line;87
82. Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 19-CO-01-9790, 2003 WL 22990114, at *12
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Nov. 3, 2003).
83. 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b).
84. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2176 (2007) (citing
29 U.S.C.A. § 255(a) (West 2007)).
85. For more statistics and information on the numbers of workers in the growing
job sectors, see Holding the Wage Floor, supra note 2.
86. RESTAURANT OPPORTUNITIES CENTER OF NEW YORK & NEW YORK CITY
RESTAURANT INDUSTRY COALITION, BEHIND THE KITCHEN DOOR:  PERVASIVE INE-
QUALITY IN NEW YORK CITY’S THRIVING RESTAURANT INDUSTRY (2005), http://
www.urbanjustice.org/pdf/publications/BKDFinalReport.pdf.
87. DOMESTIC WORKERS UNITED AND DATACENTER, HOME IS WHERE THE
WORK IS:  INSIDE NEW YORK’S DOMESTIC WORK INDUSTRY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
85 (2006), http://www.datacenter.org/reports/homeiswheretheworkis.pdf.
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• Retail workers comprise three-fifths of the 2.2 million at-or-
below-minimum-wage workers nationwide in the Bureau of
Labor Statistics Survey of Households 2002 study;88
• Fifty percent of day laborers suffer wage theft;89
• Sixty percent of nursing homes are out of compliance;90
• One in five home health-care aides lives below the poverty
level;91
• Poultry processing has a one hundred percent noncompli-
ance rate;92
• Garment manufacturing has a fifty percent noncompliance
rate.93
Workers in many of these jobs make the minimum wage or less.
The federal minimum wage is currently $5.85 per hour.  For a full-
time worker, that translates into an annual income of only $12,168.
The federal poverty level is $13,690 for a family of two, meaning
that minimum wage earners are not making enough to meet even
that meager standard of sustainability and are otherwise eligible
for public benefits.94
What does all of this mean?  It means we have an underclass of
hard-working men and women who cannot make ends meet for
their families.  In 2004, 7.8 million people in our country were clas-
sified as “working poor,” working at least twenty-seven hours per
week but still making below the federal poverty level.95  According
to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, two million workers make at or
below the minimum wage.  The Urban Institute found that 2.2 mil-
88. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CHARACTERISTICS OF
MINIMUM WAGE WORKERS:  2002 (2003), http://www.bls.gov/cps/minwage2002.htm
[hereinafter CHARACTERISTICS].
89. Valenzuela et al., supra note 41, at 14. R
90. Employment Standards Administration, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Nursing Home
2000 Compliance Fact Sheet, http://www.dol.gov/esa/healthcare/surveys/nursing2000.
htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2008).
91. Nursing Workforce, Recruitment and Retention of Nurses and Nurse Aides Is a
Growing Concern:  Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor &
Pensions, 107th Cong. (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01750t.pdf
(statement of William J. Scanlon, Director, Health Care Issues).
92. NAT’L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, LOW PAY, HIGH RISK:  STATE MODELS
FOR ADVANCING IMMIGRANT WORKERS’ RIGHTS 2 (2003), http://www.nelp.org/doc
Uploads/lphrintro112603.pdf.
93. Close to Half of Garment Contractors Violating Fair Labor Standards Act,
DAILY LAB. REP., May 6, 1996.
94. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, THE 2007 HHS POVERTY
GUIDELINES (2008), http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/07poverty.shtml.
95. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, A PROFILE OF THE
WORKING POOR, 2004 (2006), http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswp2004.pdf.
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lion immigrant workers make less than the minimum wage.96  The
employer-backed Employer Policy Foundation estimated that
workers would receive an additional nineteen billion dollars annu-
ally if employers obeyed workplace laws.97
II. FOUR LABOR-LED INNOVATIONS THAT MIGHT
MAKE A DIFFERENCE
Labor organizations have stepped into this void and instigated
several innovative efforts to reverse these trends, four of which are
described below.  These efforts seem promising, and could be repli-
cated in other contexts to create an even larger impact in the war
against unpaid wages and poor labor standards.
A. Labor-management Funded “Taft-Hartley Funds”
Labor-management partnerships between the Maintenance Co-
operation Trust Fund (“MCTF”) and a national network of fair
contracting organizations affiliated with the National Alliance for
Fair Contracting (“NAFC”) aim to stem wage and hour and other
labor standards abuses in the janitorial and construction sectors.
Also called “Taft-Hartley funds,” labor-management cooperation
committees permit employers to finance labor-management orga-
nizations established for mutually-beneficial purposes.98  The
MCTF and construction industry fair contracting funds, jointly gov-
erned by the union and contributing employers, attempt to curb
wage and hour abuses in their industries, promote fair competition,
and uphold labor standards in their industries.
The MCTF and the NAFC affiliates confront common industry
practices that drive pay lower.  Property owners subcontract out
labor-intensive work and encourage intense competition for bids
by rewarding the lowest bidder, whose only real margin is in its
labor costs.  Worker pay and benefits (if any) are the fungible costs
for these contractors, and they compete by chiseling payroll and
related labor costs to subpar levels.  Law-abiding contractors in
96. See CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 88; RANDY CAPPS ET AL., A PROFILE OF R
THE LOW-WAGE IMMIGRANT WORKFORCE (2003), http://www.urban.org/Uploaded
PDF/310880_lowwage_immig_wkfc.pdf.
97. Suzanne M. Crampton et al., The FLSA and Overtime Pay, 32 PUB. PERSON-
NEL MGMT. 331, 331 (2003), available at http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/
article/print/160714654.html.
98. In 1978, Congress passed the Labor Management Cooperation Act, adding
section 302(c)(9) to the Labor Management Relations Act (also known as the Taft-
Hartley Act), permitting jointly-funded and jointly-governed labor-management
entities.
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these fields cannot compete for business if these low-ball contrac-
tors are permitted to continue operating, and it is the latter group
of contractors who joined together with the unions to create these
innovative labor standards enforcement organizations.
1. The Maintenance Cooperation Trust Fund
MCTF, a janitorial watchdog,99 was established in 1999 by Local
1877 of the Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”), a
25,000-member local in California,100 and leading janitorial clean-
ing contractors that have collective bargaining agreements with Lo-
cal 1877.  Its mission is to abolish unfair business practices in the
janitorial industry through education of workers and employers, in-
vestigating cleaning contractors’ labor conditions, and enhancing
enforcement by public agencies and private attorneys.101  Its pur-
poses are to stop the “unacceptable treatment of janitors” and to
promote high-road jobs in the industry by rewarding the law-abid-
ing contractors.102
Signatory contractors pay between $.01 and $.05 for every hour
worked by their employees to fund MCTF.103  Currently, the or-
ganization has a staff of seven to cover all of California.  According
to a janitorial firm executive on MCTF’s Board, MCTF unionized
signatory contractors want to “level the playing field.”104
MCTF arose out of and thus knows first-hand the structural en-
forcement challenges inherent in industries like janitorial services.
Subcontracting firms argue they are not the responsible employer,
pointing instead to the contractors.105  This promotes confusion for
workers, who often do not know who their “employer” is, and
erects barriers to enforcement for public agencies and private liti-
gants, who must first prove labor standards responsibility.  Some
99. See Leonel Sanchez, Watchdog Group Helps Keep Janitorial Contractors Clean,
SAN DIEGO UNION, Jan. 28, 2004, at C1.
100. See Service Employees Int’l Union Local 1877, http://www.seiu1877.org/ (last
visited Jan. 25, 2008).
101. Telephone Interview with Lilia Garcia, Executive Dir., MCTF (July 24, 2007)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Garcia Interview].
102. Lilia Garcia, The Maintenance Cooperation Trust Fund:  Collective Action
with Responsible Employers to Prevent Worker Exploitation & Unfair Competition
15 (unpublished draft on file with author).
103. Garcia Interview, supra note 101. R
104. Sanchez, supra note 99. R
105. See id. (noting that in MCTF’s lawsuit against grocery stores, the stores
claimed the janitors were not their employees under wage and hour laws).
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firms call their janitors “independent contractors” or “franchisees,”
seeking to evade basic labor and workplace protections.106
These same subcontracting firms encourage a race-to-the-bottom
in pay.  This creates an incentive for contractors to seek out and
hire the most vulnerable workers, like immigrants, who need jobs
and will be less likely to complain.107  MCTF aims to educate and
mobilize janitors to understand their industry and take steps to
help combat sweatshop jobs.  It seeks out former janitors fluent in
Spanish to conduct the outreach and interviewing that is so crucial
to its mission.108  The janitorial industry has changed from a largely
African-American unionized workforce to an immigrant-domi-
nated, lower-paid, and non-unionized labor force in the last few
decades.109  Janitors typically work through the night in isolated
buildings, making outreach and communication with workers diffi-
cult for union organizers and agency enforcement personnel.
When discussing outreach, MCTF’s Executive Director, Lilia
Garcia, talks of reaching the “decision makers” in the industry,
meaning all players, from the building owners and janitorial con-
tractors, to the public agencies responsible for enforcing labor stan-
dards, like wage and hour, workers’ compensation, and health and
safety rules.110  Through the use of carrot and stick strategies,
MCTF cajoles, exposes, and finally sues violators if they refuse to
change.  Bringing the state wage and hour enforcement agency or a
private class action lawsuit to a problem contractor are important
tools to encourage compliance, and one of the primary ways MCTF
uses its scarce resources.111  If the state agency is engaged, MCTF
helps by investigating facts, bringing workers to the agency for in-
terviews and follow-up, and continually monitoring ongoing agency
enforcement.  Private litigation proceeds in much the same way,
with MCTF playing a close role with the workers.112
MCTF enters into monitoring agreements with trouble-prone
contractors to ensure compliance beyond the initial enforcement
activity.113  After the MCTF sent the DOL to investigate janitors’
106. Nancy Cleeland, Heartache on Aisle Three:  Sweatshop for Janitors, L.A.
TIMES, July 2, 2000, at A1.
107. See id.
108. Garcia Interview, supra note 101. R
109. See Garcia, supra note 102, at 2; Cleeland, supra note 106, at A1. R
110. Garcia, supra note 102, at 4-5. R
111. See id. at 8; see also Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Wins Back Pay for Janitors, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2004, at A16 [hereinafter Greenhouse, U.S. Wins Back Pay].
112. Garcia Interview, supra note 101. R
113. Id.
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wages in Target stores and the DOL settled with Target for
$1,900,000, MCTF entered into a monitoring agreement with Tar-
get’s cleaning contractor.114  These monitoring agreements have
their own limitations, including enforcement and fact-gathering,
but are increasingly useful in nonunion workplaces in particular.115
Garcia wants “sustainable compliance,” and sees monitoring agree-
ments as one potential source.116
MCTF has also succeeded on the legislative and regulatory
fronts in California.  It helped found a larger coalition of immi-
grant rights, labor and civil rights groups—Coalition of Immigrant
Worker Advocates (“CIWA”)—which ultimately successfully
pushed for legislation and inter-agency collaborations at the state
level to enhance enforcement and clean-up of underground econ-
omy jobs in California.117
Garcia identified the two primary challenges she faces in her
work: there are never enough resources to respond to every prob-
lem MCTF encounters, and MCTF is decidedly not set up to be a
legal services organization for individual workers with unpaid
wages problems.118  In addition, a worker’s immigration status cre-
ates barriers to enforcement due to fear.  In one high-profile case,
MCTF helped to bring an action against grocery stores for un-
derpaid janitors.  The workers had to go to court to prohibit the
stores from inquiring into the janitors’ immigration status.119  Gar-
cia says MCTF has to be more strategic when using the media in
today’s harsh anti-immigrant climate.  Long a primary tool of the
organization, which has expertly worked with the press in bringing
attention to the industry,120 Garcia admits that her tactics have be-
come quieter in her campaigns now, for fear that the ICE will raid
114. See Greenhouse, U.S. Wins Back Pay, supra note 111. R
115. See generally Estlund, supra note 1, at 353. R
116. Garcia Interview, supra note 101.
117. See Victor Narro, Impacting Next Wave Organizing:  Creative Campaign Strate-
gies of the Los Angeles Worker Centers, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 465, 504-07 (2005)
(describing California SB 1818, affirming that immigration status is not relevant for
purposes of coverage under and remedies available for wage and hour, health and
safety, and other state laws; California SB 179, the financially responsible contractor
law; and MCTF and CIWA’s advocacy for those laws).  MCTF as part of CIWA also
successfully supported a bill (AB 613) to add janitorial services to the California
Targeted Industries Partnership Program, a joint enforcement task force that ad-
dresses workplace abuses in low-wage industries. See Cleeland, supra note 106. R
118. Garcia Interview, supra note 101. R
119. See Sanchez, supra note 99. R
120. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Illegally in U.S., and Never a Day Off at Wal-
Mart, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2003; Steven Greenhouse, Among Janitors, Labor Viola-
tions Go with the Job, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2005, at A1.
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worksites where janitors are calling attention to unfair labor prac-
tices.  MCTF is now working on a community-wide response to the
recent aggressiveness in concert with its partners in CIWA.121
Can MCTF change business practices?  Going after subcontrac-
tors, no matter how big, doesn’t stop subcontracting firms from
ceasing to do business with the cleaning contractor once it becomes
a target of wage enforcers.  Target Stores did just that to its big
cleaning contractor, Global Building Services, so MCTF’s enforce-
ment results were short-lived because MCTF’s agreement was with
Global.122  Targeting worksite building owners or tenants who en-
gage the cleaning contracting firms, as SEIU’s “Justice for Janitors”
campaign did, has longer lasting impacts because the building
owner or tenant has to comply with the agreement, regardless of
the cleaning contractor it uses.
Creating lasting change in the public agencies is an additional
hurdle to success for MCTF in Garcia’s eyes; the state agencies are
susceptible to political pressures not to over-enforce labor stan-
dards laws, and MCTF constantly fights that countervailing urge.
A good portion of MCTF’s limited resources are spent educating
and working closely with state agency investigators and Garcia
wonders whether that intensity pays off.123  Garcia responds mod-
estly that her organization is “by no means a success,” because
she’s just fighting for the floor, essentially the minimum wage and
overtime, not a living wage.124
2. National Alliance for Fair Contracting (“NAFC”)
NAFC is a national network of labor-management organizations
founded in the late 1990’s, whose members include fair contracting
organizations, labor-management groups, contractors, contractor
associations, international and local unions, and building and con-
struction trade councils.125  Its mission is to promote fair con-
tracting approaches to create a level playing field for responsible
bidders on publicly-financed construction projects.126  NAFC
brings together labor, management, and government to enforce the
Davis-Bacon Act and related prevailing wage acts by bringing the
121. Garcia Interview, supra note 101. R
122. See Estlund, supra note 1, at 363 n.45.
123. See id.
124. Garcia Interview, supra note 101. R
125. Nat’l Alliance for Fair Contracting, http://www.faircontracting.org (last visited
Jan. 25, 2008).
126. Telephone Interview with Phillis Payne, Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Alliance for Fair
Contracting (July 30, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Payne Interview].
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perspective of both contractors and workers to the public contract
process.  It serves as a clearinghouse for information on prevailing
wages and public works, and it sponsors educational seminars on
public works compliance.  Recently, NAFC has become active in
combating independent contractor misclassification, a rampant
problem in construction jobs, and has sponsored studies to deter-
mine the costs of independent contractor abuses.127  NAFC cur-
rently has over twenty-five affiliated fair contracting groups around
the country.128
Fair contracting groups in the construction industry arose in the
1980s, after the national highway construction boom in the 1950’s
where publicly-funded heavy highway construction projects began
in earnest, the rise of the building and construction trades in the
AFL-CIO, and the Taft-Hartley labor-management committee ad-
dition in 1978.129
Karen Courtney, the Executive Director of the NAFC-affiliated
Foundation for Fair Contracting Massachusetts (“FFCM”), estab-
lished in 1992, described her organization’s job as helping union-
ized construction firms to compete in a low-bid scenario when
government oversight is limited.130  FFCM educates and provides
direct assistance to non-unionized construction workers with wage
and hour violations.  It meets these mostly-immigrant workers
through its connections to community groups and its access to cer-
tified payroll reports.  FFCM also works directly with the state
agencies charged with enforcing the prevailing wage law, provides
site-specific information on payroll problems, gathers evidence of
violations, and keeps track of any investigations or cases the agen-
cies opened.131  Courtney believes that this kind of intensive work
is key to effective enforcement.
Like the MCTF, employer contributions to labor-management
committees fund NAFC affiliates.132  FFCM is funded by a $0.2 per
“man-hour worked” fee, and is jointly governed by construction
contractors and partner unions representing laborers, carpenters,
127. See Prevailing Wage Studies, Nat’l Alliance for Fair Contracting, http://www.
faircontracting.org/NAFCnewsite/prevwage.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2008).
128. See Fair Contracting Groups, Nat’l Alliance for Fair Contracting, http://www.
faircontracting.org/NAFCnewsite/faircontgroups.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2008).
129. Payne Interview, supra note 126. R
130. Telephone Interview with Karen Courtney, Executive Dir., Found. for Fair
Contracting Mass. (Aug. 29, 2007) (on file with author).
131. Id.
132. Id.
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electricians, roofers, and other trades.133  With a staff of six, the
biggest challenge FFCM faces, according to Courtney, is finding
resources.134  FFCM’s strength is its credibility in the field.  State
agency inspectors know and respect its work, as do workers and
contractors.  Contractors see that a lack of enforcement of wage
laws impacts their business.135
NAFC and its affiliate the Indiana, Illinois & Iowa Foundation
for Fair Contracting were instrumental in helping pass Illinois’
landmark Employee Classification Act, which plugs loopholes in
construction contractors’ abuse of “independent contractor”
misclassifications.136
B. AFL-CIO’s New National Worker Center Partnership
Since the mid-1990’s, the AFL-CIO has worked more closely
with community groups and immigrant worker communities
outside the federation’s membership ranks.  These collaborations
have spawned new partnerships with leading worker center
networks.
Community-based organizing groups aimed at improving the
work lives of lower-wage and often immigrant workers have be-
come an important educational, advocacy, and mobilizing force in
our country.  Loosely called “worker centers,” they are often es-
tablished to organize workers in specific jobs, like restaurant work-
ers137 or day laborers.138  Others organize immigrant and low-wage
workers in a city or locality, targeting campaigns at a variety of
“bad apple” employers from a variety of job sectors.  Examples
include the various worker centers in the Interfaith Worker Justice
(“IWJ”) network of faith-based worker centers,139 the Chinese
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. For a copy of the bill, see http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ (search “HB1795”;
then follow “Full Text” hyperlink).
137. A leading example is the Restaurant Opportunity Center of New York, cre-
ated by workers employed by the restaurant Windows on the World after the Septem-
ber 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center. See Restaurant Opportunities Center
of New York (ROC-NY), http://www.rocny.org (last visited Jan. 25, 2008).
138. There are many day laborer organizing groups around the country.  Many of
these groups have joined together to create a national network, the National Day
Laborer Organizing Network (“NDLON”). See National Day Laborer Organizing
Network, http://www.ndlon.org/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2008).
139. As of November 14, 2007, the Interfaith Worker Justice, based in Chicago, has
fifty-two affiliated worker centers around the country, advocating for the rights of
employees in such varied jobs as nail salon employees, day laborers, car wash work-
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Staff and Worker Association,140 La Raza Centro Legal,141 and the
newly-founded New Orleans Worker Center for Racial Justice, cre-
ated during the Hurricane Katrina clean-up effort to advocate for
fair treatment of workers in New Orleans.142
Worker centers conduct research, mobilize and educate workers,
and advocate for policy reforms.  The number of worker centers is
growing; ten years ago, there was less than a dozen and now there
are over 139 centers in 31 states.143  Worker centers have often
viewed themselves as an alternative to traditional labor organiza-
tions.144  For their part, unions have at times challenged worker
centers’ hiring halls that send lower-paid workers to non-union
contractors, undermining labor’s position in the local labor market.
Mostly, the two communities did not overlap much.  A leading sur-
vey undertaken in the early 2000’s found that only 14% of worker
centers had a direct connection to unions.145
In 2006, the AFL-CIO’s Executive Council passed a resolution
permitting formal ties with worker centers.  This decision conferred
worker centers with the rights to join central labor councils or state
labor federations as associate non-voting members to work on is-
sues together.146  The National Day Laborer Organizing Network
(“NDLON”) was the first to partner officially with the AFL-CIO
in August 2006.147
ers, and poultry processors. See Interfaith Worker Justice, http://www.iwj.org/out
reach/lg.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2008).
140. See Chinese Staff & Workers’ Association, http://www.cswa.org/www/index.
asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2008).  The Chinese Staff & Workers’ Association is one of
the oldest worker centers in the U.S., and has led successful campaigns for restaurant,
construction, delivery, and garment workers, among others. See Chinese Staff &
Workers’ Association Campaigns, http://www.cswa.org/www/campaigns.asp (last vis-
ited Jan. 25, 2008).
141. See Centro Legal de la Raza, http://www.centrolegal.org/ (last visited  Jan. 25,
2008).
142. See, e.g., SPLC Exposes Exploitation of Immigrant Workers, SOUTHERN POV-
ERTY LAW CENTER (Aug. 16, 2006), http://www.splcenter.org/legal/news/article.jsp?
site_area=1&aid=205.
143. See Janice Fine, Worker Centers:  Organizing Communities at the Edge of the
Dream, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 417, 421 (2005-2006); A National Worker Center—
AFL-CIO Partnership, AFL-CIO (Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisis
theaflcio/ecouncil/ec08092006j.cfm [hereinafter National Worker Center].
144. See Hilary Russ, Making Change:  Union Schmooze, CITY LIMITS MAGAZINE,
Feb. 2003.
145. See Fine, supra note 143, at 421; National Worker Center, supra note 143. R
146. See National Worker Center, supra note 143. R
147. See Press Release, AFL-CIO & NDLON, Largest Organization of Worker
Centers, Enter Watershed Agreement to Improve Conditions for Working Families
(Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.aflcio.org/mediacenter/prsptm/pr08092006.cfm.
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AFL-CIO President John Sweeney, calling it a “watershed part-
nership,” noted in making the announcement that it was time to
bring worker centers and unions closer together.148  Pablo Alva-
rado, the executive director of NDLON, added,
The growing worker center movement shows that the fight for
change at work has never been as vibrant, varied and urgent.
Yet the end goal remains the same: to ensure that the rights and
freedoms of workers aren’t reserved just for a few, but extended
to the many—regardless of where you were born, the color of
your skin, your gender or migratory status.149
The collaboration is aimed at combining the respective strengths
of the partners for a greater good.  Both Alvarado and Sweeney
note the benefits of the union’s access and political expertise and
the worker center’s close ties to community, to workers, and the
movement overall.150
Worker centers allow immigrant and low-wage communities to
take advantage of the union’s access to policy-makers and legisla-
tors.  They also have other tools at their disposal, not permitted by
unions, including the ability to use pressure tactics on users of
goods or services, which are prohibited by unions under the secon-
dary boycott provisions of labor law.151
The stated policy aims of the partnership were to work together
to enforce existing rights and new laws in wage and hour standards,
health and safety rules, immigrant rights, and independent contrac-
tor abuses.152  The partnership also aimed to work together for
comprehensive immigration reform, including a path to citizenship
and workplace rights for all workers, regardless of their immigra-
tion status.153
On the heels of the partnership with NDLON, the AFL-CIO and
the Interfaith Worker Justice network’s fourteen faith-based
worker centers joined forces in December 2006, outlining nearly
identical collaboration policy aims.154
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 (West 2007) (ruling secondary boycotts are illegal).  This
charge has now been leveled at some worker centers, who are starting to look more
like unions. See David Rosenfeld, Worker Centers:  Emerging Labor Organizations—
Until They Confront the National Labor Relations Act, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 469 (2006).
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See Press Release, AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO & Interfaith Worker Justice, A Na-
tional Coalition of Faith-Based Worker Rights Groups, Enter Agreement to Improve
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Since these partnerships were announced, the AFL-CIO has
hired several full-time persons in a variety of departments dedi-
cated to implementing the collaboration.155  Around its one-year
anniversary, six worker centers affiliated with local central labor
councils in New York City,156 Alameda, California,157 and else-
where.158  Worker centers have joined with the AFL-CIO on local
campaigns, including the recent New York City-based campaign by
the taxi workers to oppose the City’s imposition of costly global
positioning systems and credit card machines in all taxicabs, for the
taxi driver’s purchase.159  An Austin, Texas collaboration has gen-
erated a city-level Day Labor Advisory Committee to recommend
policies for day laborers.160
Determining what to do about immigration reform continues to
challenge worker centers and the partnership.161  NDLON worked
with the AFL on comprehensive immigration reform, which has
presently stalled at the federal level.  NDLON’s immigration re-
form goals differed slightly from the AFL-CIO’s, but the federa-
tions were sufficiently in agreement on the basics to make
collaboration worthwhile.162  Getting institutional support on both
sides will take time, but it is early.  Although concrete projects on a
larger scale have not yet emerged, there are options, including col-
Conditions for Marginalized Workers (Dec. 11, 2006), http://www.aflcio.org/media
center/prsptm/pr12112006a.cfm.
155. Interview with Milo Mumgaard, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, AFL-CIO, in New
York, NY (Aug. 22, 2007) (on file with author).
156. See James Parks, Taxi Drivers Line Up to Join CLC, AFL-CIO NOW BLOG
NEWS, Nov. 28, 2006, http://blog.aflcio.org/2006/11/28/taxi-drivers-line-up-to-join-new-
york-clc.
157. Centro Legal de la Raza joined the Alameda County Central Labor Council in
California. See John J. Sweeney, President of the AFL-CIO, Remarks at the NDLON
Assembly, Washington D.C. (Aug. 3, 2007), http://www.aflcio.org/mediacenter/pr
sptm/sp08032007.cfm [hereinafter Sweeney Remarks] (discussing the relationship be-
tween Centro Legal de la Raza and the Alameda County Central Labor Council in
Oakland, California).
158. See id.
159. See James Parks, New York Taxi Drivers Oppose Constant GPS Monitoring,
AFL-CIO NOW BLOG NEWS, July 26, 2007, http://blog.aflcio.org/2007/07/26/new-york-
taxi-drivers-oppose-constant-gps-monitoring.
160. See James Parks, Worker Center Alliances:  The Austin Example, AFL-CIO
NOW BLOG NEWS, July 2, 2007, http://blog.aflcio.org/2007/07/02/worker-center-alli-
ances-the-austin-example.
161. See Sweeney Remarks, supra note 157.
162. See, e.g., Declaration from the Day Laborer Community Regarding Legaliza-
tion, http://www.ndlon.org/old/docs/legalizaEN.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2008); What
Union Members Should Know About the AFL-CIO Policy on Immigration, http://
www.aflcio.org/issues/civilrights/immigration/upload/AFLCIOPO.pdf (last visited Jan.
25, 2008).
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laborations on prevailing wage enforcement in construction, cross-
cultural trainings and education on health and safety protections,
and encouraging worker center members to enroll in union appren-
ticeship programs.163
C. The SEIU’s Wage and Hour Project
The SEIU organizes workers in several low-wage sectors where
it encounters serious wage and hour violations, including janitors,
home health care, security officers, and nursing home workers, to
name a few.
To stem the fair pay abuses it observes and build on its earlier
work engaging in direct wage and hour litigation including in its
Justice for Janitors campaign, in the early 2000’s, SEIU instituted a
wage and hour enforcement project to support direct wage and
hour cases for workers in these sectors.164  The project engages in
direct litigation by SEIU counsel and sometimes outside private
firms with expertise in wage and hour laws.165  SEIU identifies and
then examines high-priority problems it learns of from its research-
ers and organizers.166  The union then investigates violations that
come to its attention, and if warranted, puts together a team of
lawyers to handle the enforcement action.167
As part of this project, SEIU has brought high-impact cases to
recover unpaid travel time for home health-care workers in Illinois
and Pennsylvania, unpaid overtime and off-the-clock pay for
nurses in Ohio, unpaid waiting time for security guards, and over-
time for janitors around the country.168  SEIU also supports direct
wage and hour litigation by its counsel.  The recent United States
Supreme Court case Long Island Care at Home Ltd. v. Coke,169
163. See Jayesh M. Rathod, The AFL-CIO-NDLON Agreement:  Five Proposals for
Advancing the Partnership, 14 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 8, 12 (2007).
164. Telephone Interview with Judy Scott, Gen. Counsel, SEIU (Oct. 23, 2005) (on
file with author).
165. Id.
166. Telephone Interview with Janet Herold, Assoc. Counsel, SEIU (Aug. 29, 2007)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Herold Interview].
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Vega v. Contract Cleaning Maint., Inc., No. 03 C 9130, 2004 WL
2358274, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2004); Colburn v. Albertson’s, Inc., No. B185198,
2006 WL 2686654, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2006).
169. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2341 (2007); see also, Press
Release, SEIU, Supreme Court Case Could Affect Availability of Quality Home Care
for Growing Senior Population (Apr. 10, 2007), http://www.seiu.org/media/pressre-
leases.cfm?pr_id=1386.
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challenging the exemption from minimum wage and overtime for
home health-care companions, is one high-profile example.
The wage and hour project is strategic, choosing its enforcement
actions carefully and with an eye toward long-term impact.  In ad-
dition to recovering unpaid wages for the workers, these cases have
influenced the targeted sectors’ business practices and clarified le-
gal standards.  For example, janitors hired by contractors sued re-
tail grocery stores in southern California for off-the-clock work and
changed the way the stores view their contractors’ labor practices;
home health-care employers in Pennsylvania now understand more
clearly that their workers’ travel time must be compensated; and
employers in Oregon must now pay security guards for waiting
time.  Because the cases are often brought on behalf of lower-wage
workers, the litigation helped to dismantle barriers to enforcing
fair pay rights as well, including clarifying the right to equitable
tolling for workers receiving a notice of a FLSA action, and limit-
ing mandatory arbitration of wage and hour claims by lower-wage
workers.170
SEIU’s efforts to promote fair pay do not stop with private liti-
gation.  It is a major partner in the newly-established States Attor-
neys General Program at Columbia University, which encourages
state attorneys general to engage in affirmative protective enforce-
ment actions in several substantive areas, including labor and em-
ployment.171  SEIU, along with other unions and the AFL-CIO,
also work closely with state departments of labor to identify key
workplace standards problems in the states and develop targeted
enforcement priorities, and has worked with advocates around the
country to draft new legislation and regulations targeting minimum
wage and overtime abuses in the states.172
170. See Herold Interview, supra note 166. R
171. See National State Attorneys General Program at Columbia Law School,
http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/ag/; see also Peter Romer-Friedman,
Eliot Spitzer Meets Mother Jones: How State Attorneys General Can Enforce State
Wage and Hour Laws, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 495 (2006) (exploring the vari-
ous roles that state governments have assigned to state attorneys general and labor
departments to enforce state wage and hour laws).
172. For an example of some of these innovations, see NAT’L EMPLOYMENT LAW
PROJECT, JUSTICE FOR WORKERS:  STATE AGENCIES CAN COMBAT WAGE THEFT, A
NELP GUIDE FOR ADVOCATES (2006), http://www.nelp.org/docuploads/Justice_for_
Workers.pdf [hereinafter JUSTICE FOR WORKERS].
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D. New York Civic Participation Project
The New York Civic Participation Project (“NYCPP”) is a coali-
tion of New York City local unions, community groups, and worker
advocates that was formed after September 11, 2001 to organize
union and community members around common issues, including
education, health care, housing, and immigrant rights.173  Inspired
by models of community organizing and worker centers, the
NYCPP aims to make unions not just providers of job benefits but
rather a locus for social movements.  NYCPP develops leaders, sets
policy goals, performs outreach and education, and partners with
other organizations in campaigns on labor and immigrant rights.
NYCPP encourages active union members to engage other mem-
bers of their communities in NYCPP activities, and organizes
union members from a variety of unions in immigrant neighbor-
hoods in New York City.174
According to Gouri Sadhwani, the organization’s former direc-
tor of organizing and campaigns, “[t]he goal is to increase partici-
pation among new immigrants, legal or not, in political, economic
and civil processes from the neighborhood level on up—the project
aims to merge the concepts of union activism with community ad-
vocacy, but on an individual level.”175
NYCPP promotes workers’ human rights by supporting access to
health care, public safety, fair pay, good working conditions, educa-
tion, immigration reform, and voters’ rights.176  With over a thou-
sand members, its neighborhood committees have developed
campaign priorities and then partnered with organized labor to
promote their campaigns.  Many of the recent campaigns, centered
around access to drivers licenses for immigrants, safe and usable
city parks, and for Muslim school holidays in New York City public
173. See New York Civic Participation Project, http://nycpp.org/en/index.html (last
visited Jan. 25, 2008) [hereinafter New York Civic Project].  NYCPP is a project of La
Fuente, a non-profit organization founded in New York.  NYCPP founding members
were the SEIU Local 32BJ, the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Interna-
tional Union (Unite Here! HERE) Local 100, the American Federation of State, City
and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) District Council 37, the National Employment
Law Project (NELP), and Make the Road By Walking. See New York Civic Partici-
pation Project Partners, http://www.nycpp.org/en/partners.html (last visited Jan. 25,
2008).
174. See New York Civic Participation Project Mission, http://nycpp.org/en/aboutus.
html (last visited Jan. 25, 2008) [hereinafter New York Civic Mission].
175. Russ, supra note 144. R
176. See New York Civic Mission, supra note 174.
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schools, have not been only about pure workplace rights.177
NYCPP gets union members and immigrant communities together
working on issues of common concern, and in turn teaches the
partners about the relative value of the other.  By emphasizing civil
participation and community empowerment, NYCPP aims to ener-
gize and mobilize a base of active immigrant community members
from unions and immigrant neighborhoods.  It uses the media,
street protests, and old-fashioned cajoling to bring in unions and
public figures.178  It is as much about organizing unions as it is
about organizing community and neighborhood members.179
A high-profile example of the organization’s muscle was the
2006 “Day Without Immigrants” rally in April 2006.  Hundreds of
thousands of immigrants in New York City and around the country
turned out to protest a draconian immigration bill proposed by
Representative Sensenbrenner and passed by the House that
would have criminalized undocumented aliens present in the
U.S.180  Carrying signs saying, “Today we March, Tomorrow we
Vote,” the march brought together unions organizing some of the
lowest-paid workers in the City, immigrants, politicians, and com-
munity activists.181  While they have not agreed on an adequate
comprehensive immigration reform policy at the federal level,
many of these immigrant groups and unions have agreed on basic
principles, like fighting anti-immigrant measures, family reunifica-
tion of immigrant families, workplace protections, and civil rights
for all, regardless of immigration status.182
NYCPP is a recent example of “social unionism,” where unions
go beyond serving their members on the job and branch out into
non-workplace issues.  The NYCPP’s goal is to enliven the grass-
roots voices of immigrants at the local level and pair them with the
institutional power of unions and advocates to change policy.  Its
focus on union members builds support for neighborhood concerns
within the unions themselves.
177. See New York Civic Participation Project Campaigns, http://www.nycpp.org/
en/campaigns.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2008).
178. See, e.g., Jennifer Manley, Immigration Bill Gone But Not Forgotten, QUEENS
CHRONICLE, July 5, 2007, available at http://nycpp.org/en/documents/QueensChroni-
cleJuly122007.pdf.
179. See Russ, supra note 144. R
180. See generally Jarrett Murphy, Under One Flag, VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 25, 2006.
181. See id.
182. See id.; see also AFL-CIO Basic Principles (adopted Dec. 5, 1955), http://www.
unitedwaywb.org/Labor/AFL-CIO_Basic_Principles/afl-cio_basic_principles.html
(last visited Jan. 25, 2008).
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These recent attempts to cast a wider net are strategic.  As union
membership declines, immigrants comprise a growing percentage
of the labor force, and as more union members are foreign-born,
unions like SEIU 32 BJ have no choice.183  Hector Figueroa, SEIU
32 BJ’s Secretary-Treasurer, remarked, “[d]emographics are chang-
ing.  The immigrant workforce is going to be an increasing share of
who the union members are.”184
III. CURRENT SUCCESS AND HOPE FOR THE FUTURE
The four examples profiled here have key elements for success:
they aim to create rooted institutions with close ties to communi-
ties, they have clear goals and situate themselves strategically
within a broader advocacy field, and they see that change will not
happen instantaneously and intend to keep at it beyond the short
term.
Each of the innovators has already had impressive success: the
MCTF and NAFC affiliates have amassed a deep understanding of
the challenges confronting wage enforcers and have become key
partners in those efforts.  The AFL-CIO’s worker center partner-
ship had an important role in the federal comprehensive immigra-
tion reform debate and currently invests countless hours of staff
time to solidify the relationships between the members of both
partners to pave the way for future projects.  The SEIU’s wage en-
forcement project has delivered tangible law reform results, not to
mention money to underpaid workers in lower-wage jobs.  The
NYCPP led a campaign to convince New York’s Governor Spitzer
to permit undocumented persons to get drivers licenses, despite a
federal mandate on national identification, permitting the
thousands of immigrants in New York to drive safely to get to
work.185
Are these innovations sustainable?  Will they result in lasting
change and provide important supports for the ever-crumbling
wage floor?  First, any model for gaining lasting change in the qual-
ity of jobs and in particular the pay of those jobs must have collab-
oration with others as a core component.  Labor cannot prevent
the dismantling wage floor alone, nor can worker centers, immi-
grant, women’s, or consumer groups.  Progressive workplace
change throughout history has occurred through strong partner-
183. Two-thirds of SEIU 32BJ’s members were foreign-born in 2003. See Murphy,
supra note 180.
184. Russ, supra note 144. R
185. See New York Civic Participation Project, supra note 173. R
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ships between labor and community, and between labor and law-
abiding employers.  The AFL-CIO’s worker center partnership and
NYCPP are defined by their union-community collaborations, as
MCTF and the NAFC affiliates are defined by their union-em-
ployer-government ones.  While the unions’ partners may change
due to shifting allegiances, financial, and other outside pressures
faced by most community groups, the strategy of collaboration
should not.  These groups must also figure out how to become fi-
nancially self-sustaining, as MCTF and NAFC have begun to do.
Without strong institutional (union, employer, or government) sup-
port from partners with resources, these models will fizzle.186
Second, the projects must have a goal of establishing institutions
that will outlast the immediate campaigns or short-term purposes
of the collaboration.  This means institutions with resources and a
mandate to keep policing the workplace.  Establishing offices for
immigrant community outreach within the federal and state de-
partments of labor and state attorney generals’ offices, where
ongoing and changing needs of lower-wage and immigrant workers
can be brought to the attention of government wage enforcers is
one example.187  Another example is assigning staff persons within
the AFL-CIO and leading affiliate unions with responsibility for
tending to and promoting the partnerships, as the AFL-CIO and
SEIU have done with their respective projects.  Establishing a
union in a previously unorganized workplace is another example.
When unions are present, minimum wage and overtime pay be-
come the bare minimum demands, and ongoing monitoring of
workplace conditions with protections for workers who stand up
and report abuses becomes standard.  Day laborer groups have in-
creasingly begun to seek public financing for day labor centers,
where law-abiding employers can hire workers in a safe environ-
ment and workers can learn English and receive assistance with a
variety of life needs.188
186. See Estlund, supra note 1, at 366-67.  Without unions, resources, and the ability R
to follow through with long-term monitoring, the code of conduct model will fail.
187. These offices exist in several state departments of labor and the New York
State Attorney General’s office, for instance.  For examples of similar government-
infused institutions, see generally JUSTICE FOR WORKERS, supra note 172.
188. See, e.g., Nat’l Employment Law Project, Statement of Amy Sugimori, Hear-
ing on Day Laborers Before the Council of the City of New York Committee on
Immigration (Mar. 31, 2005), http://www.nelp.org/docUploads/day%20labor%20testi-
mony%20city%20council%20march%2031%202005.pdf; Testimony of Siobha´n Mc-
Grath, Hearing before the New York City Temporary Commission on Day Laborer
Job Centers (June 28, 2006), http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/down
load_file_39232.pdf.
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Finally, these innovators must continue to support and build a
social consciousness in our country focused on the importance of
treating all workers with dignity, regardless of race or ethnicity.
Paying a fair wage and supporting unionization and good jobs in
turn support our economy and all of us.189  The recent failure of
comprehensive immigration reform at the federal level and the cor-
responding anti-immigrant initiatives at the state and local level
have exacerbated immigrant and low-wage workers’ fear and de-
spair.  It has emboldened employers who exploit these workers
with impunity.  Lilia Garcia at the MCTF says the recent ICE raids
have forced MCTF to be “quieter” campaigns, and worker centers
and SEIU encounter low-wage and immigrant workers afraid to
come forward to complain of unpaid wages because of employer
retaliation and threats related to the workers’ immigration status.
These partnerships must combat the political and social ignorance
causing this debilitating fear and its effects.
The decline of unions and employer aggression against labor or-
ganizing of any kind shows that labor and its allies face mounting
obstacles to maintaining a foothold in the struggle for fair wages
and good jobs.  Thomas Kochan, a leading expert on today’s work-
places, concludes that “[u]nions have declined for several mutually
reinforcing reasons: deregulation, industrial change, globalization,
and increased employer resistance.”190  To create entrenched
change, the efforts profiled here must contend with these broader
factors and aim for deep-seeded organizing in workplaces and
across communities.
The organizations modeled in this Article have varied contexts
and chosen strategies; some are adversarial and do not court col-
laborative relationships with their opponents, like the SEIU wage
enforcement project, the NYCPP, and the AFL-CIO and worker
center campaigns.  Others, like NAFC and MCTF, partner with
powerful employers whose market-share is dropping due to the
fierce undercutting by low-ball contractors, thus creating a more
intimate relationship with “the other side.”  This combination of
efforts is necessary to combat the undercutting of jobs.  All use
lawsuits, the media, and pressure tactics to move their agenda, and
189. Some argue that we need a whole-scale political, social, and economic reversal
to effect change today, and that labor is poised to help in that transformation, if it
ceases to be isolated and joins with other social movements, as it did in the 1930s. See
DAN CLAWSON, THE NEXT UPSURGE:  LABOR AND THE NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS ix-
xi (2003).
190. Thomas Kochan, Wages and the Social Contract, AMERICAN PROSPECT, May
2007, at A22.
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all are engaged in this war.  If the projects can be brought up to
scale and modeled in more places, real and lasting change for
workers, their jobs, and our economy is within reach.
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